

Methods

We consider an insurance company that has n insured objects. The probability density of the occurrence of an insured event

$$p=e^{-f\xi}$$

depends on the preventive measures carried out by the insurant for the amount of f . The effectiveness of these measures ξ is determined by the results of statistics on the object of insurance for several time periods for a number of parameters. The expected damage

$$X=p\chi$$

depends on the probability p and on the amount of damage χ . The insurance premium V depends on the share of the insured risk γ^S

$$X^S = \gamma^S X, 0 < \gamma^S < 1$$

and the insurance rate T :

$$V=X^S \cdot T,$$

where X^S is the insured damage. This parameter differs from the entire damage, because the insurant can transfer part of the damage γ^S to insurance in order to reduce the insurance premium.

The amount of insurance compensation W depends on the damage $X=p\chi$ and on the level of the insurer's liability α ($0 < \alpha \leq 1$):

$$W=X \cdot \alpha.$$

The compensation W depends on the possible damage X and on the insurer's methods of calculating the damage, which are expressed in the parameter α .

The insurer's profit function is

$$\Pi = \sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - p_i W_i) = \sum_{i=1}^n e^{-\xi_i f_i(T_i)} \chi_i (\gamma_i^S T_i - \alpha_i) \quad (1)$$

The problem of searching for the optimal vector of rates $\vec{T}^* = \{T_1^*, T_2^*, \dots, T_n^*\}$, is based on the maximization of the insurer's profit

$$\{T_i^*\} = \arg \max_{0 < T_i < 1} \Pi \quad \text{subject to} \quad \begin{cases} \frac{df_i}{dT_i} < 0, \\ 0 < \xi_i < 1, \\ \alpha_i \leq \gamma_i^S, \\ \sum_{i=1}^n (\gamma_i^S T_i - \alpha_i) > 0. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

We consider various types of the function $f_i(T_i)$ that satisfy the condition $\frac{df_i}{dT_i} < 0$. These are the functions of the following form

$$f_i(T_i) = -k_i T_i + b_i, \quad (3)$$

$$f_i(T_i) = e^{-k_i T_i} + b_i, \quad (4)$$

$$f_i(T_i) = \frac{k_i}{T_i} + b_i, \quad (5)$$

where k_i and b_i are the parameters of the function $f_i(T_i)$, they depend on the terms of the insurance contract and on the system of discounts for rates in the frame of the preventive measures.

Results

Proposition: The vector \vec{T}^* is the solution of problem (1)-(2), and it has the following coordinates:

$$\text{for } f_i(T_i) \text{ of type (4) } T_i^* \text{ is solution of equation } T_i^* + \frac{e^{-k_i T_i^*}}{\xi_i k_i} - \frac{\alpha_i}{\gamma_i^S} = 0, \quad (6)$$

$$\text{if } k_i e^{-k_i T_i^*} (\xi_i - 1)(\gamma_i^S T_i^* - \alpha_i) + 2\gamma_i^S < 0,$$

$$\text{for } f_i(T_i) \text{ of type (5) } T_i^* = \frac{\xi_i k_i}{2} \left(\sqrt{1 + \frac{4\alpha_i}{\xi_i k_i \gamma_i^S}} - 1 \right), \quad (7)$$

$$\text{if } \frac{\xi_i \gamma_i^S k_i + 2\alpha_i}{2} \left[\sqrt{1 + \frac{4\alpha_i}{\xi_i \gamma_i^S k_i}} - 1 \right] - \alpha_i < 0.$$

FUNCTIONS X , T^* AND PARAMETERS FOR METALLURGICAL AND ELECTRICAL ENTERPRISES

Parameter	Metallurgical enterprise	Electrical enterprise
ξ	$5.96 \cdot 10^{-6}$	$1.1 \cdot 10^{-5}$
χ	555.58 million rubles	39.94 million rubles
X	$555.58 e^{-5.96 \cdot 10^{-6} f}$	$39.94 e^{-1.1 \cdot 10^{-5} f}$
T^*	$T_M^* = 39 \cdot 10^{-5} \left(\sqrt{1 + 5065.2 \frac{\alpha_M}{\gamma_M^S}} - 1 \right)$	$T_E^* = 2.9 \cdot 10^{-5} \left(\sqrt{1 + 68610.6 \frac{\alpha_E}{\gamma_E^S}} - 1 \right)$




Fig. 1. T_M^* for metallurgical enterprise




Fig. 2. T^* for metallurgical and electrical enterprises for $\alpha=0.1$